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Abstract: 
Within this paper we provide insight into how the activities associated with security 
verification and validation (V&V) are practiced, supported, and perceived, within software 
SMEs. We justify the importance of studying security V&V as a socio-technical activity and 
employ the Socio-Technical Interaction Network (STIN) framework when presenting the 
results of an industry-based empirical study. In summary, the results indicate that software 
SMEs are significantly less confident in their engagement with security-focused V&V 
activities as opposed to traditional software V&V. This includes their ability to perform and 
own the activities, as well as how they are supported and managed within the organisations 
studied. This suggests that security-focused V&V activities have not reached the same degree 
of maturity as the more traditional software V&V activities within software SMEs. 
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1. Introduction: Motivation and Study Context 
The reliance on software for our everyday existence is now without question, however, this 
reliance requires a dependability that is not universally evident in the software currently 
being developed and deployed. Developing software, regardless of its intended application, is 
an inherently complex task. However, software failures, and software project failures, lead to 
costs being incurred by both the software consumer and producer - costs which could 
potentially be mitigated. It is reported that greater than 50% of all released software contains 
defects that affect its execution in some form (Shull et al., 2002) and, although defects are, in 
general, costly to both users and organisations, vulnerabilities are regarded as having greater 
impact (McGraw, 2006). The software producer can lose revenue or go out of business 
(Wysopal et al., 2006). Further, it is apparent that many vulnerabilities are the result of a 
small number of causes - implying that the same mistakes continue to be made (Piessens, 
2002). The focus on SMEs is pertinent when we consider that they are fundamentally 
important to the majority of the world’s economies (Mac an Bhaird, 2010). Also, most 
software producing organisations are small (Fayad et al., 2000). However, despite the growth 
and contribution of the software industry to national economies, there are many examples of 
software quality lapses - thus impacting the view that software can be used to build secure 
systems (Parnas and Lawford, 2003). 
 
In addition, we observe that the software industry spends more money on locating and 
addressing defects than any other activity. Software verification and validation (V&V) is 
known to comprise a substantial share of a project’s budget e.g. it is typical for software 
testing to account for at least 50% of a project’s costs (Myers, 2004). More time is also being 
spent on such activities (Sung and Paynter, 2006). Therefore, it is clearly concerning that 
considerable financial outlay and human effort is being expended on activities tasked with 
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locating defects but yet, as noted above, we continue to release software with defects - often 
making the same mistakes. It is no wonder then that vulnerabilities continue to be reported 
(Eschelbeck, 2005). This is a clear indication that there must be a problem somewhere with 
actual security V&V practice. However, as software is constructed by humans and, therefore, 
is not going to be perfect (Patton, 2005), we further observe that it is a problem that cannot be 
solved purely by adopting a technical perspective. We note that the majority of V&V 
literature primarily focuses upon technical aspects e.g. studies comparing specific methods or 
tools. It is important to consider software V&V as a socio-technical activity. 
 
2. Software V&V: A Socio-Technical Activity 
Software V&V involves the interaction between people (e.g. engineers and managers) and 
their interactions with specific technical methods and technologies so as to perform their 
allocated tasks. Socio-technical issues (such as those within Table 1) are known to influence 
software V&V, for example: engineer attitudes can affect unit testing within an organisation 
(Ellims et al., 2004); developer motivation needs improving in terms of unit testing (Runeson, 
2006); and motivation to review another’s work is a recognised challenge (Kollanus and 
Koskinen, 2006). Significantly, we note that such socio-technical issues “affect everything 
about software engineering, including the adoption and implementation of software 
engineering processes and technologies” (Henry, 2005, p. 110). It is, therefore, important to 
understand both the social and the technical aspects of security V&V if we are to improve 
existing practice by means of process improvement and tool adoption. Further, we observe 
that such social factors have real impact on the quality of the software being developed by 
software producing organisations (Bird et al., 2009), with many software failures being 
explained by human factors (Tomayko and Hazzan, 2004). As such, we conduct our study 
through use of the Socio-Technical Interaction Network (STIN) framework. 
 
Interaction As software products are generally too complex to be developed by individuals, software 
testing requires tools that support team communication (Mosley and Posey, 2002). Software 
reviews also require effective teamwork (Aurum et al., 2002) and, specific security V&V 
techniques, such as fuzz testing, are known to be a combined effort “between security people 
and quality assurance people” (Takanen et al., 2008, p. xx). 
Collaboration 
and 
cooperation 
Test engineers interact with different people (both technical and non-technical), at different 
levels, internal and external to their organisation (Hass, 2008). Software reviews should be 
conducted with a cooperative team spirit (Jawadekar, 2004) and test engineers “must find a 
way to focus on the software defect without seeking to place blame” (Everett and McLeod, 
Jr., 2007, p. 20). Conflict can lead to reluctance in developer and test engineer cooperation 
(Vogel, 2011). 
Motivation Software V&V involves both creative and intellectually challenging tasks (Myers, 2004), 
however, a lack of motivation can impact these activities  e.g. (Runeson, 2006; Kollanus and 
Koskinen, 2006). Software engineers are known to be motivated by conflicting needs (Fairley, 
2009), however, software testers are known to be motivated by an interest in the task (it must 
be viewed as an intellectual challenge), as well as by reward and praise (Hass, 2008). A lack 
of management support is known to cause software testers to lose both motivation and interest 
(Perry, 2006). 
Table 1: The social and human aspects of software V&V 
 
2.1. Socio-Technical Interaction Networks (STINs) 
A STIN is defined as a “network that includes people (including organizations), equipment, 
data, diverse resources (money, skill, status), documents and messages, legal arrangements 
and enforcement mechanisms, and resource flows” (Kling et al., 2003, p. 48). Its use 
highlights the relationships between people and their relationships with technologies (Walker, 
2008). We have already observed that software V&V involves interaction between people, as 
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well as their interactions with specific technical methods and technologies in order to perform 
their tasks. In summary, STIN identifies groups of interactors and then models the 
relationships between them (van der Merwe, 2010). Kling et al. distil the methodology for 
constructing a STIN into a series of steps as captured in Table 2. 
 
Step 1: Identify a relevant 
population of system 
interactors and core 
interactor groups 
This step is concerned with identifying and characterising potential interactors 
i.e. identifying the actors, their roles and the way they participate within the 
system. The identified interactors are then grouped together by role. Kling et al. 
also note that the identified groups might overlap and, in some instances, have 
conflicting roles (Kling et al., 2003). 
Step 2: Identify incentives Incentive structures are then identified. This involves understanding the potential 
motivations of the interactors (Meyer, 2007). 
Step 3: Identify excluded 
actors and undesired 
interactions 
It is critical to not only understand desired interactions, but also undesired ones 
(Kling et al., 2003). This is deemed an often overlooked step in socio-technical 
research (Meyer, 2007). 
Step 4: Identify existing 
communication forums 
Within this step the existing communication sys tems, used by the interactors, are 
identified. 
Step 5: Identify resource 
flows 
Involves understanding how resources flow throughout the network. Resource 
flows can have direct and indirect influence on interactions within the network 
and involves “following the money” (Kling et al., 2003). Resource flows also 
include expertise (Meyer, 2007). 
Table 2: Analysis steps of a Socio-Technical Interaction Network 
 
STIN has been used to study, and explain, a number of different complex social systems 
involving information technology (Urquhart and Currell, 2010). For example, Scacchi 
applied STIN to study free / open source software development processes to explore the 
social and technological interactions found within different research and development 
communities (Scacchi, 2005). Specifically, Scacchi acknowledges that STIN draws attention 
to the “relationships that interlink what people do in the course of their system development 
work to the resources they engage and to the products (software components, development 
artifacts, and documents) they create, manipulate, and sustain”. Scacchi concludes that STINs 
provide a “better” way to “observe the contexts in which people carry out software 
development processes and related work practices”. As noted by Kling et al.: “STIN models 
help us to understand human behaviors in the use of technology-mediated social settings” 
(Kling et al., 2003, p. 48). The activity of security V&V fits perfectly within the definition of 
a technology-mediated social setting. 
 
3. Research Methods 
We devised an instrument which comprises between 30 and 62 open and closed questions 
(the number being dependent on a respondent’s responses). As the state of security V&V, 
within software SMEs, is effectively an empirical unknown (Kreeger and Harindranath, 
2012), a survey is a suitable means of obtaining a snapshot of the current status (Wohlin et 
al., 2003). Importantly, it also permits the beliefs and opinions of a sample to be generalised 
(Easterbrook et al., 2008). We pre-tested the instrument with 11 subject matter experts prior 
to circulation. In summary, just over 15 hours were spent sitting with the respondents, 
resulting in instrument refinement. 
 
Our sample was derived through use of the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database 
(Bureau van Dijk, 2017), which is a well-established means of determining a study sample. 
Our search strategy applied the following restrictions: the organisation must be a software 
producer i.e. fall within SIC sub-class 62.01/1 or 62.01/2 and an SME i.e. not exceeding 249 
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employees and a turnover of €50 million (we did not utilise the “use estimates” option 
available within FAME). In addition to the devised search strategy, we also applied some 
further refinement to the returned set of results. Employing an additional filtering step is 
consistent with others utilising FAME e.g. (Martínez-Caro and Cegarra-Navarro, 2010). This 
resulted in a total of 160 organisations being identified. We further supplemented this 
probability sample through convenience sampling. 
 
3.1. Response Rate Analysis: Subject Sensitivity 
It is observed that “[t]he topic of a survey has a clear impact on people’s willingness to take 
part in it” (Tourangeau et al., 2000, p. 261). Certainly, topic sensitivity is considered one of 
the primary factors resulting in survey non-response (Kays et al., 2013). As our research 
focuses on information security, we recognise that this is “one of the most intrusive types of 
organization research” (Kotulic and Clark, 2004, p. 604). However, it is with this in mind that 
we acknowledge that whilst our survey response rate is 18.13% (in terms of the FAME 
sample), we feel, like Kotulic and Clark, that this can be explained by virtue of our study 
falling into both an under-researched area, as well as one that covers a sensitive topic. Based 
on this, we adopted convenience sampling to further supplement the responses received. This 
resulted in an additional 8 responses, and thus a total of 37 responses overall. By way of 
comparison, we observe that Thörn and Gustafsson consider the 27 responses received to 
their survey - which also focused on software development within SMEs - as “a response rate 
that is comparable to other surveys in software engineering” (Thörn and Gustafsson, 2008, p. 
23). Singer et al. found “a consistent response rate of 5% to software engineering surveys” 
(Singer et al., 2008, p. 15) and a response rate of 12.6% within one SME study was 
considered: “within reasonable and expected limits” (Rasmussen and Thimm, 2009, p. 86). 
We, therefore, consider the level of response to our survey as being acceptable. This view is 
further strengthened when considering the type of respondents reached, namely: experienced, 
senior employees situated within a technology-focused, SME organisational context. 
 
3.2. Respondent Demographics 
Approximately three quarters of the respondents were from medium-sized organisations 
(<250 employees), the remainder being considered small (<50 employees). The organisations 
vary in age from 1 - 2 years to over 20 years, however, the majority are classified as being 
“mature” (24% indicating 6 - 10 years) or “old” (67% indicating over 10 years), which adds 
strength when interpreting the results. Specifically, if the majority of organisations were 
considered “entrants” (<1 year old) it would be easy to dismiss any findings as being 
unreliable. Further, the organisations target a variety of industry sectors with their products. 
We find that 10 industry sectors are represented e.g. information and communication 
(including products such as secure collaboration and network management solutions), 
financial and insurance activities (including online trading systems) and the education sector 
(including parent to school communication systems). This diversity helps to provide further 
insight and ensures that any results can be generalised. We also observe that the organisations 
utilise a variety of software development methodologies, which clearly influences the V&V 
being performed. However, our results support the “increasing popularity of agile methods” 
(Ryan and O’Connor, 2013, p. 1615) as we find that Agile is practiced in some form by 86% 
of the respondents. Test-driven development is the next most widely employed methodology 
(41%), followed by Waterfall (35%) and then the V-Model (32%). Seventy percent of the 
organisations employ at least two different methodologies. 
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The respondents should be well positioned to ensure that the data received is an accurate 
reflection of the situation. As such, 81% are leads, managers or senior managers, holding 
positions such as CTO, COO, Head of Software, Director of Software Development, Test 
Manager, Senior QA Manager or Team Leader. Tenure is also an important factor to consider 
when interpreting the responses as it “helps define an employee’s knowledge and perspective 
on the organization” (Crawford and Leonard, 2012, p. 64). Over a third of the respondents 
have worked for their current organisation between 3 - 5 years. Approximately a quarter 
exceeding 6 years, the remainder under 3. The average tenure for a software engineer is under 
two years (Appelbaum, 2001). However, it is also important to consider a respondent’s 
software experience as a whole as such collective experience will result in a more critical eye 
when reflecting upon their current situation. Approximately 95% of the respondents have at 
least 6 - 10 years of software experience, with 62% having over 11 years. All respondents 
have at least 3 - 5 years of software experience. Seventy percent of the respondents have 
previously held test-related roles, 30% development-based roles and 22% a variety of other 
software roles (e.g. support engineer and consultant). Approximately 65% of the respondents 
have worked for other SMEs, 81% for large organisations. In summary, we believe that the 
respondents engaged bring both a wealth of experience and a variety of perspectives. 
 
4. Results 
We begin our analysis by determining whether the various software and security V&V 
activities are performed within the surveyed organisations and how frequently. As captured 
within Figures 1 and 2, it is apparent that the traditional software V&V activities are 
performed with more regularity than the security-focused V&V activities. Aside from the 
drop in regularity that an activity is performed, we also see a marked increase in the number 
of “Do Not Know” responses. We now proceed to structure our analysis of software and 
security V&V practice within SMEs through the application of STIN. 
 
4.1. Step 1: Interactor Analysis 
We find a fairly diverse set of human interactors involved with the various software and 
security V&V activities. Unsurprisingly, developers and test engineers are the primary (i.e. 
more frequently involved) type of interactor, with the traditional role divide between these 
interactor groups being evident - namely: developers are much more involved in performing 
and owning review-based activities and test engineers the test-based activities. All of the 
organisations surveyed clearly distinguish between these two interactors which, given the 
wide adoption of Agile (i.e. advocating the “generalist”) was a little surprising. 
 
Secondary interactors include outsourced engineers and customers. We found a greater 
dependency on outsourcing for the security V&V activities - with a desire to further increase 
its use - both in terms of performing, and owning, the security-focused activities. Whilst there 
is also an increase in view (but not as significant) that the software V&V activities should be 
outsourced, this was in terms of performing an activity and not its ownership. There was also 
a desire to further engage customers across both sets of V&V activities. Lesser involved 
interactors include business analysts, product management, support and sales teams. There 
were also notable “exceptions”, with one organisation involving their internal infrastructure 
team “to advise on the type of security issues we might hit”, and another involving their Chief 
Security Officer. However, in both cases, room for improvement was evident. For example, 
the Chief Security Officer was not involved in any security design reviews and the internal 
infrastructure team was noted as needing to become engaged with the developers and test 
engineers performing penetrating testing. 
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Figure 1: Software V&V activities 
 
 
Figure 2: Security V&V activities 
  
We also observe diversity in terms of the non-human interactors. Specifically, we found that 
the software V&V activities were more likely to have tool support, with the respondents more 
readily able to discuss the tools used within the context of such activities. When it came to 
discussing the tools supporting the security-focused activities the respondents were more 
likely to indicate “Do Not Know”. Two respondents indicated this was due to a reliance on 
outsourcing which, with the noted desire to increase its use, the situation can only worsen. In 
a similar vein, we find that the software V&V activities were more likely to have a governing 
process than the corresponding security-focused activities (the respondents were also more 
confident in articulating the situation). 
 
4.2. Step 2: Incentives 
A variety of incentives were found to help motivate the identified interactors in performing 
the V&V activities. Specifically, we found the primary motivator in performing any V&V 
activity was through a desire to improve software quality. However, we found that this to be 
more prevalent in terms of the software V&V activities than the corresponding security-
focused activities. We ascribe this to interactors not affording due importance to security as a 
quality attribute. The second most frequently indicated motivator was acknowledging and 
adhering to a governing process. We found that this was more pronounced in terms of the 
software V&V activities. This is further evidence that such activities have reached a higher 
level of maturity. There was very little indication to suggest that the interactors are motivated 
by a sense of fun when performing any of the V&V activities. Conversely, there is little 
indication that they are motivated to perform the activities to solely “tick a box”. 
 
Collectively what these results show, aside from a desire to improve software quality, is that 
the interactors appear to be more motivated to perform the V&V activities due to external 
influences (i.e. a mandating process, instruction from management and requests from 
customers) than by intrinsic factors - such as deriving enjoyment from the activity itself. That 
we found the most prevalent incentive to be a desire to improve software quality is supported 
by the existing literature on motivation in software engineering e.g. (Hall et al., 2008). 
However, we confirm this within SMEs and within a V&V context. We also found that this 
level of intrinsic motivation varies dependent on the type of activity. The software V&V 
activities were more likely to be motivated by this factor than security-focused activities. This 
is clear indication that security - as a quality attribute - is not afforded, or perceived by the 
interactors as having, as much worth as other quality attributes. 
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4.3. Step 3: Excluded Actors and Undesired Interactions 
It is apparent that undesired interactions - both of a social and technical nature - exist, as well 
as that some of the identified interactors either are - or should be - excluded from certain 
activities. Specifically, the activities, as practiced within the vast majority of organisations 
surveyed, suffer due to resourcing constraints and / or social factors. Whilst we find 
commonality in some of the reported constraints and factors, there are also marked 
differences. For example, we find that the traditional activities are more likely to be impacted 
by a lack of people, whereas the security-focused activities are more likely to be impacted by 
a lack of training and knowledge (this is the most common reason given for never performing 
a security V&V activity). In addition, we find that the security-focused activities are less 
likely to receive management support, whereas the traditional activities are more likely to 
suffer from poor communication. 
 
We find that test engineers are more likely to be excluded from review-based activities and 
developers from test-based activities. This helps further emphasise the split between 
interactor type and activity. However, we find an acknowledgement, within the organisations, 
to move away from such separation. We speculate the significant adoption of Agile has 
helped foster this view. Although, overall, the most excluded interactor was the test engineer 
- which helps emphasise the imbalances which exist between the two primary interactors. 
There are more reported instances of actively wanting to exclude interactors - in terms of the 
security-focused activities - than the traditional activities. 
 
The security-focused activities were also more likely to suffer from a lack of interactor 
motivation. This is somewhat unsurprising, since as the security-focused activities were more 
likely to be impacted by a lack of management support, it is, by extension, probable, that the 
level of motivation exhibited by the interactors will be further weakened. In turn, it is this 
lack of motivation which is likely to result in the activities being performed less effectively. 
This is liable to result in a vicious cycle, whereupon, the organisation is not witness to any 
significant benefits - as the activities are being practiced in a sub-optimal manner - therefore, 
there is not such a strong incentive to invest and actively support the activities. We find 
evidence to support the view that only by failing in terms of software security is an 
organisation more likely to become actively invested in such activities. As stated by one 
respondent: “I think security only raises its head when things go wrong”, with another 
indicating: “I would say we generally have the (in my opinion, wrong) opinion that if 
customers want to test our products for security issues they can, and we generally only 
perform security testing when forced. I am attempting to change the culture within the 
organisation to bring the importance of security testing up the scale. We have had some 
incidents lately with customers that are starting to support my case”. As the costs of such 
failure can be high, this is an expensive lesson to learn. 
 
4.4. Step 4: Existing Communication Forums 
Although we identified the developer and test engineer as the primary interactors, we find, 
when it comes to communicating the results of the V&V activities, that it is the developer 
who is the most informed type of interactor. For example, we find that the results of review-
based activities are not typically communicated to the test engineer. This not only highlights 
the traditional divide between the two interactors, but also shows an undesired state, since: 
“[c]ode reviews allow for dissemination of key information” (Coram and Bohner, 2005, p. 
365). As Coram and Bohner observe, code reviews, as a means of communication, permit 
familiarisation with a product’s “inner workings”. By not possessing this level of 
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understanding i.e. treating it as a black-box, the ability to detect vulnerabilities is reduced 
(Potter and McGraw, 2004). Therefore, whilst this does not impact traditional test-based 
activities, it does impact those which are security-focused. 
 
We also find that test-based activities - both software and security-focused - are more likely 
to communicate results through formal documentation than review-based activities. This is 
probably in part due to the levels of outsourcing found in terms of penetration testing, as well 
as the fact that the test tools reported as being in use typically offer the ability to auto-
generate sets of results (which is supported by one respondent indicating that the “[r]esults of 
automated testing are a factor in all releases”). Further, a combination of communication 
mechanisms are used per activity e.g. formal documentation and verbal communication. 
 
4.5. Step 5: Resource Flows 
The average level of expenditure, per activity, is found to be higher in terms of the traditional 
activities than the corresponding security-focused activities. As captured by one respondent, 
the impact of a “[l]ack of resources” is the reason why “[n]o aspect of security is tested”. 
Software testing incurs the most costs of any V&V activity (averaging 37% on a typical 
project) - a finding which echoes existing literature - but one which we confirm within an 
SME context. The respondents were more likely to indicate that additional investment was 
required in terms of the security-focused activities than the traditional activities. Whilst this is 
a clear indication that the respondents acknowledge the value of such activities, it is through 
analysis of the results that we find such investment needs to be carefully directed, for 
example: 
 
 Whilst a lack of budget is the primary reason for why tools are not used, it is the 
primary reason for why both traditional and security-focused tools are not used. 
 Tools supporting communication between the interactors can, and are, applied to both 
the traditional and the security-focused activities. 
 The average levels of automation (we recall that automation is considered expensive 
(Everett and McLeod, Jr., 2007)), per activity, are comparable when contrasting the 
traditional and corresponding security- focused activities. 
 
However, where investment could make a significant difference is in terms of training and 
improving the level of employee knowledge within the organisations as we find the level of 
training afforded to the respondents as being rather limited. Specifically, there was negligible 
review-based related training found but, in terms of software testing, there was considerably 
more (approximately 70% of the organisations provided such training). However, this level of 
support drops significantly for security-focused test-based training (falling to ~30% for 
security testing and ~20% for penetration testing). We find that the majority of training 
received was over 12 months ago. We also find that organisations are, overall, more likely to 
support training in forms which incur the least direct costs e.g. reading and mentoring (which, 
collectively, comprise almost 63% of all training received). In summary, we find that the 
levels of training afforded by the organisations are constrained - being both limited in terms 
of opportunity and frequency, as well as being potentially out-of-date. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The impact of vulnerable software is well known and far reaching in its consequences: 
information insecurity incurs significant costs (reportedly in the billions (Schneier, 2007)). 
Coupled with the observation that software SMEs are developing significant products (Fayad 
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et al., 2000), it is clearly essential that such organisations ensure the security of their products 
through a rigorously applied, and well supported, security V&V process. However, our 
results show that within software SMEs, security V&V is performed less frequently than the 
traditional software V&V activities; also, we find that the respondents had more difficulty in 
elaborating upon the security-focused activities being performed within their organisations. 
We thus conclude that software SMEs are significantly less active, and confident, in their 
engagement with security V&V as opposed to software V&V. Specifically, they have greater 
confidence in their ability to perform, and own, the software V&V activities. We also find 
that these activities are better supported and managed. This is confirmed by: 
 
 Very limited engagement with internal security expertise outside of the core 
engineering team e.g. Chief Security Officer or infrastructure team. This suggests that 
software SMEs are not utilising their internal resources as effectively as possible. 
 A noticeable absence of internal roles dedicated to performing security V&V related 
activities e.g. security test engineer or penetration tester (or even a more generic 
security engineer). This is likely to result in security taking second place to other 
quality attributes and / or the increased reliance on outsourcing. 
 The traditional software V&V activities being more likely to have supporting tools 
and a governing process. This shows that the security-focused V&V activities are not 
as well supported and managed which, in turn, further helps deprioritise security as a 
quality attribute. 
 
Collectively, the above highlights that the security-focused V&V activities have not reached 
the same degree of maturity as the more traditional software V&V activities within software 
SMEs. However, the finding that a lack of security-focused training and knowledge is one of 
the primary factors impacting the security-focused activities further emphasises, and 
supports, the view that security V&V encompasses a complex set of activities, requiring a 
blending of knowledge, across a variety of domains. As found, this has a greater detrimental 
impact on the security-focused activities. Unfortunately, whilst we find that there is a 
recognised need for further investment in these activities, it is clear that this is yet to result in 
the provision of training within the SMEs. In general, training was found to be rather limited, 
and whilst this is supported by the existing literature regarding SMEs, we are able to confirm 
that this extends to encompass all software V&V activities. Further compounding the 
situation, we find that the security-focused activities are less likely to receive management 
support and are more likely to suffer through a lack of interactor motivation. In conclusion, 
the findings suggest that software SMEs need to improve on how security V&V is practiced, 
supported, and perceived, in order to avoid releasing software products containing 
vulnerabilities which could then be exploited. 
 
It was by identifying the human and non-human interactors, and exploring their relationships, 
that a more nuanced understanding was developed. For example, whilst some V&V studies 
only enumerate the tools used (effectively, just performing interactor analysis), we examined 
the relationships between interactors (i.e. STIN steps 3 - 5) to show how the tools were used 
and what impacted their use. Equally, if we had just focused on network relationship analysis, 
the results may have been misinterpreted. For example, we found penetration testing to be the 
activity least impacted by a lack of time (which was, overall, the most frequently reported 
constraint across all of the activities). However, the interactor analysis enabled us to identify 
that a significant reliance on outsourced engineers existed for this activity i.e. any time 
constraints caused by limited resourcing (a common problem within small organisations) 
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would be effectively removed. Therefore, we found that the adoption of STIN permitted a 
more complete and thus, accurate understanding of security V&V within SMEs. 
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